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This paper analyzes why governments in Greece have systematically 
appealed to ‘Europe’ during their domestic privatization discourse. It 
illustrates that, when proposed policy reforms get rough and the 
opposition grows, governments anticipate garnering increased public 
justification in order to implement their policies by justifying their 
choices in the name of Europe. In addition, it attempts to contribute 
to the opening up of discourse analysis in the field of political science 
and to reveal how the institutional arrangement across a polity is at 
least partially responsible for the approach national actors pursue in 
it and the form of the domestic discourse they produce. 
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Privatization in the Name of ‘Europe’:  
analyzing the telecoms privatization in Greece from a 




From the period when the Greek application to the EEC was discussed in the 
national parliament in 1977 up until today, major decisions in Greek politics 
have been largely justified by the national actors in the name of ‘Europe’. In 
1977, the Greek PM Konstantinos Karamanlis interrupted the speech of the 
leader of the Opposition, Andreas Papandreou, who had previously accused the 
government of sacrificing the country at the altar of ‘we belong to the west’. 
The PM argued that Greece belongs to the western world both by tradition and 
interest. Three decades later, when the Greek PM George Papandreou 
announced to the nation the reason why the country had to resort to the 
activation of the EU-IMF economic support mechanism and eventually apply a 
series of austere reforms, he also systematically referred to Europe. PM 
Papandreou stated (BBC:23.04.2010) that ‘our European partners will 
decisively contribute to provide Greece the safe harbour that will allow us to 
rebuild our ship.’  
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This paper examines the reason why political leaders in Greece -over and 
above party lines- have continuously felt the need to refer to ‘Europe’ as the 
main legitimating factor of their chosen policies. It examines the relationship 
between the national institutional layout and the form of the communicative 
discourse, as the ultimate resource to overcome domestic blockages. The latter 
involves the effort made by national actors to justify, usually via public 
deliberations the application of a policy. According to Schmidt (2008:310-311) 
communicative discourse ‘consists of the individuals and groups involved in 
the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of political ideas to the general 
public.’ For example actors that favour privatization will promote by all means 
and attempt to legitimate the policy to the general public. Simultaneously 
though, all those actors that oppose the policy will make an effort to impede or 
even block the policy. Both sides communicate their responses to the general 
public stimulating the national discussion. The objective is to win over as much 
of the general public as possible in order to legitimate the application of their 
policy-choices.  
The argument supported is that in polities where the institutional layout does 
not incorporate interest groups within a functional corporatist system and its 
political settings are largely characterized by political and social polarization, 
national governments that attempt to justify their policy choices often appeal 
directly to the general public. In such cases, if governments do not come up 
with a sufficiently legitimating communicative discourse about the application 
of privatization they may face sanctions ranging from mass protests to loss of 
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public confidence. Therefore, during an intensive communicative discourse 
they appeal to the citizens rendering them as the ultimate judge of the necessity 
of the policy. They seek to follow a particular discourse that will 
simultaneously justify privatization, but more importantly, will facilitate them 
to build an impetus and garner adequate public support to implement the 
policy, because they believe that the outcome they hoped for is not feasible if 
supported only in its merits. In such cases, the policy process takes the form of 
rhetorical frames appealing to shared political, social and economic 
understandings. According to Campbell (1998: 394), in an attempt to justify 
their political and technical choices, policymakers employ ‘symbols and 
concepts with which to frame solutions to policy problems in normatively 
acceptable terms through transposition and bricolage.’  
This paper argues that the national strategic goals were identified by the 
national actors in the discourse and built around the prospect of failing to keep 
in track with the main EU policies including the completion of the single 
market, and EMU participation. Governments chose to associate the application 
of privatization with the realization of grand strategic national goals, related to 
the EU, with which citizens could theoretically identify their interests thus 
hoping that the general public would show more understanding for its 
application. The analysis specifically explores the telecoms privatization 
politics in Greece throughout the last two decades and presents the type of 
discourse and the nature of the arguments domestic actors employed in order to 
justify their policy choices. Examining the telecoms privatization discourse is 
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interesting because of the always increasing role of telecoms in the well-being 
of a modern society and its fundamental influence in most sectors of a national 
economy. In addition, it is possible to examine the effect ‘Europe’ had in the 
public debate regarding the status of the ownership and the functioning of the 
main telecoms provider by looking into the response the national actors had to 
the extensive EU legislative initiatives in the sector. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Discursive institutionalism 
This paper employs new institutionalism as the theory that examines the way 
institutions interact and affect society and affirms the critical role they have in 
the conduct of political affairs such as privatization. New institutionalism states 
that a society’s institutional settings not only structure the behavior of its 
actors, but they also set the boundaries within which choices are made and 
through which preferences are derived and expressed. As Peters (1999:150) 
points out ‘institutions are considered the central component of political life. In 
these theories institutions are the variables that explain most of political life, 
and they are also the factors that require explanation. The basic argument is 
that institutions do matter, and that they matter more than anything else that 
could be used to explain political decisions.’ 
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However, it builds on the theoretical framework linking new institutionalism 
with discourse analysis. The latter unfolds in the form of ideas that are publicly 
articulated by national actors who compete among themselves in the process of 
convincing their targeted audiences about the appropriateness of their views. It 
is not only limited to what is actually said in the national discussion, but 
signifies under what conditions and how national actors appealed to each other 
and exemplifies the various complex issues entailed within the political process 
of a polity. March and Olsen (1995:66) argue that ‘discourse serves to explain 
political events, to legitimate political actions, to develop political identities, to 
reshape and/or reinterpret political history and, all in all, to frame the national 
political discussion.’ 
Such an approach is useful when examining privatization politics because it is 
inadequate to explain the privatization process by relying exclusively on the 
type of institutional layout a country has. At the same time it would not be 
possible to investigate discourse in isolation, as it is only one among various 
possible features that explain policy change. Schmidt and Radaelli (2004:193) 
coin the term ‘discursive institutionalism’ arguing ‘that discourse must be set in 
institutional context, not only as one factor among a range of salient factors, but 
also in terms of its institutional setting, that is, in terms of the vast range of 
rules – culturally framed, path dependent, or interest-based on the national 
level, institutionally agreed at the EU level – that affect policy-making in any 
given socio-political setting.’ Schmidt (2008:303) argues that ‘the newest “new 
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institutionalism,” discursive institutionalism, lends insight into the role of ideas 
and discourse in politics.’ 
 
2.2. Europe as a legitimating factor 
Although the EU has manifestly kept a neutral position on the issue of 
ownership and has not openly promoted privatization, it would not be possible 
to analyze the national privatization discourse without examining the impact of 
the EU policy effects on the domestic policy making process. As Lane (1997) 
argues ‘it is difficult to explain the emergence of privatization on the agenda of 
so many different nations at roughly the same time if we take it for granted that 
it is domestic factor variables that mainly determine policy’. 
In European politics, during the last two decades, the announcement and 
application of privatization has profoundly challenged each country’s political 
institutions. Although, EU legislation and policy have not explicitly required 
member states to privatize state owned entities their effects -among others the 
liberalization directives, the single market, EMU and EU competition 
legislation- have been so important that in some cases they acted like an 
external stimulus which severely influenced the domestic discourse. In fact, 
before the completion of the fully liberalized EU telecoms market (1998) all 
member states had proceeded with at least the partial privatization of their 
telecoms. Thatcher (2001:574) notes that ‘in telecommunications, binding 
supranational legislation offered major domestic advantages for national 
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governments of providing impetus for reform and a means of blame-shifting. 
Governments used EC legislation “imposed by Brussels” to justify reforms 
such as liberalization and privatization and to aid them to overcome domestic 
opponents to change such as trade unions and parts of the political left’.  
Although ‘Europe’ may be utilized as a legitimizing device within the domestic 
discourse, the references to ‘Europe’ as such are not always consistent in its 
substance. For example, on some occasions governments have legitimated their 
privatization programmes by linking ‘Europe’ with ideological claims and on 
others with fiscal planning needs. Wright (1994:6-7) supports that ‘one can 
distinguish between the ideologically and politically inspired privatization 
ambitions of the neo-liberal conservative governments…and the more 
pragmatic and limited ambitions of the governments elsewhere…in some cases, 
this package [privatization] is ideologically inspired…in others it represents a 
reluctant managerial adjustment to changed economic and financial 
circumstances’.  
Neo-liberal advocates believe and openly advocate that the public sector will 
improve its economic and administrative efficiency, only if market oriented 
policies such as privatization are applied in most sectors of an economy. In this 
case national actors have used the processes leading to the single market and 
the EMU and the EU liberalization directives as the main tool that would 
legitimate their neo-liberal ideological beliefs. The root of the privatization 
movement has been based on the principle that market competition in the 
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private sector should take precedence over socio-political criteria, as the former 
provides citizens with better services, more choices and secures important 
economic benefits for the government. Peters and Pierre (2003:4-5) state that 
‘the strategy seems to have been that future legitimacy of public sector 
institutions should rest less on traditional values like universality, equality and 
legal security and more on performance and service delivery…the reform of the 
public administration over the past several decades has concentrated on the 
managerial aspects of government, attempting to make government more 
efficient, effective and economical. These three Es have driven a massive 
change in the public sector, much of it focusing on the role of the market as an 
exemplar for good management’. 
In the absence of an expressed ideological pledge, governments have 
legitimized their privatization programmes on pure financial considerations 
related to the performance of the national economy and the fiscal needs. In 
some occasions, governments publicly stated that they would accelerate their 
privatization programmes in order to achieve fiscal stability, and therefore, 
keep in track with their responsibilities as they were set by the EU, particularly 
in order to participate in the EMU. In other words, the selling of state assets 
raises money for public sector managers and for governments which are under 
the pressure to divest from a state problem such as reducing the public debt or 
fill in budgetary gaps. Privatization has proved to be an attainable method to 
raise capital, ease down fiscal difficulties and reduce the public debt. Wright 
(1994:24) remarks that ‘despite its problem-ridden and paradoxical nature 
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privatization will remain on the European policy agenda, if only for financial 
reasons. It is a pot of gold for governments short of money and unwilling to 
raise taxes.’ Similarly, Kay (in Wright 1994:5) describes that even 
governments that had intensely opposed it in the past eventually acknowledged 
that ‘achievable objectives became reasons to justify the programmes’.  
The argument built here is that Europe whether considered as a positive or 
ultimate legitimating resource for troubled national governments may act as a 
means to justify policies that are otherwise less likely to obtain assent. Thatcher 
(2004:284-309) acknowledges the significance the EU has in the justification 
of national policy choices and notes that ‘using the EU to legitimate reforms is 
linked to discourse: actors use European integration as part of strategies of 
‘communicative discourse’ to obtain assent to reforms...Discourse is a weapon 
for certain actors; and offers public evidence for the use of European 
integration as a resource’. At the same time though, it is necessary to point out 
that although all member states were required to deal with the EU policy 
effects, not all of them found Europe as a positive resource that would assist 
them in the justification of their national privatization programmes. As Clifton, 
Cumin and Diaz (2006:740) underline ‘privatization in the EU has its own 
defining features, patterns, hallmarks and “values”. Developments in the EU 
have acted as catalysts or filters and may be used to explain the development of 
EU privatization’. 
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3. The case-study 
3.1. The pro and anti European politics in Greece during the 1970s and 
1980s 
Ever since the reestablishment of democracy in 1974 and up until the mid 
1990s there were two vital ideological differences separating the two main 
political parties: Nea Dimokratia (ND) and the Pan-Hellenic Socialist 
Movement (PASOK). The first one dealt with the international status of the 
country and whether Greece should join the EU and NATO, and the second 
largely concerned the dispute of liberalism versus socialism. Both debates were 
intense and polarized the political and social climate to a great extent that 
would last until the mid 1990s.   
From the moment the two new political parties were founded in 1974, the 
debate concerning prospective Community membership arose as one of the 
most divisive issues drawing a line between their leaders. ND’s founder 
Konstantinos Karamanlis was a genuine supporter of an economically and 
politically united Europe and immediately made it clear that ND was a political 
party with an unambiguous European orientation. This was verified by the 
party’s founding manifesto (ND:04-10-74) which declared that ‘ND believes 
that Greece not only has the right, but can actually safeguard the pride and the 
happiness of the people, within Europe, where it belongs, if it makes sure to 
mobilize all the competence and virtues of its people. Independently of its size, 
Greece’s cultural heritage, the Hellenic aura and the spirit of the Greek people 
can assist Europe politically, ethically and culturally in order to complete the 
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European union.’ In contrast, PASOK’s ideological position was to directly 
oppose EU and NATO membership. This was clearly outlined in its founding 
manifesto (PASOK:03-09-74) which proclaimed that ‘Greece should withdraw 
from NATO… Greece should detach itself from any military, political and 
economic alliances that undermine our national independence and the right of 
the Greek citizens to decide for themselves concerning social, economic and 
cultural aspects of life’. 
Regarding economic policy, ND underlined the importance of competition and 
coexistence of the public and private sectors and was committed to liberalize 
certain state monopolies. The party’s manifesto made it clear that ‘a liberalized 
market in which ND has faith does not exclude the economic enlargement of 
the sectors controlled by the state. In addition, the private initiatives cannot be 
justified without the parallel participation of the wider social classes in the 
allocation of the national product’. PASOK was a political party that advocated 
socialist ideals and aimed at representing the under-privileged Greek citizen. 
Characteristically, its manifesto (PASOK:03-09-74) favoured ‘the socialization 
of the financial system in all possible aspects including the means of 
production and also the imports and exports of trade…we will socialize the 
property of the monasteries…we will abolish private education…we will 
abolish private healthcare’. In short, as Lyrintzis (2005:244) underlines ‘the 
Greek political parties, as in the case in other European countries, used the 
Left-Right divide as a means to create and promote a political identity, and its 
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content was manipulated according to the exigencies of the political 
conjuncture’.  
Due to the two successive electoral victories of Karamanlis’ ND in the 1974 
and 1977 elections, the debate on Europe tilted toward the direction the ND 
governments set. In fact, after the 1974 elections, PM Karamanlis pointed out 
that membership to the EU was the primary goal of his government, mainly for 
reasons of safeguarding the democratic consolidation. He regarded that 
membership would sustain Greek interests within a powerful democratic 
economic community. More importantly, his diplomatic maneuvers achieved 
the early conclusion of the accession agreement which was signed in May 
1979. PASOK criticized the government and described EU membership as the 
means of surrendering Greek interests to the objectives set by the unwanted 
foreign powers. At the same time despite the liberal character of his 
governments’ economic policy, in the name of democratic consolidation, 
Karamanlis insisted that the state should regain the control of certain crucial 
sectors of the national economy and therefore proceeded with a wave of 
nationalizations. These included Olympic Airways (OA)1, Greek Electrical 
Railways, Refineries and the Commercial Bank.  
Two very important political developments which eventually proved to be 
conflicting sparked change in the Greek political arena in 1981. First of all 
Greece became the 10th member of the EEC. Indeed, Greece’s future partners 
                                                 
1
 The nationalization of OA in 1975, previously owned by Aristotle Onassis, was one of the most 
famous nationalizations performed by the government. 
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did not accept her application with much warmth as the Commission had 
advised the Council not to accept the application on economic grounds.  
Secondly, Andreas Papandreou’s charismatic personality, his well-known 
family name2 and socialist language made him the only alternative to a ND 
government leading his party to the electoral landslide of the 1981 general 
elections.  
The combination of Greece having entered the EEC and Papandreou’s lack of 
eagerness to adjust to EEC policies led to a troublesome relationship between 
the Community and Greece during the 1980s. Papandreou, who had opposed 
membership found himself within the European Council. He had repeatedly 
argued that Greece should disengage itself from foreign alliances that alter the 
Greek national interests in favour of the foreign powers. Veremis and 
Koliopoulos (2003:19) underline that ‘the functional relationship between 
Greece and its Western allies was challenged by the advent of the Socialists in 
power. The anti-Western undertones in PASOK’s pronouncements, after three 
decades of almost uninterrupted official loyalty to the US and the European 
allies, partly reflected the sentiments of those that had been excluded from 
public life due to their left-wing affiliations. It also reflected widespread 
disappointment with the West’s failure to censure the military junta between 
1967-1974’. However, Papandreou’s radicalism receded and several conflicting 
issues, especially regarding the international status of the country and 
withdrawal from the Community, were gradually abandoned. 
                                                 
2
 His father Georgios Papandreou served as PM during the 1940s and 1960s. 
  14 
However, there was no equivalent shift in public economic policy as the 
government was not willing to adjust it according to the Community set 
objectives. It was repeatedly emphasized by Papandreou that the Greek 
economy should change in order to serve national interests, not international. 
PASOK was pursuing an economic model that entailed the protection and even 
extension of state monopolies, but also aimed to ensure that certain key sectors 
of the economy would be exclusively under state control and ownership. The 
government laid emphasis on two strategies: nationalization and socialization. 
In terms of the nationalization programme the most significant measure took 
place in 1983 when the government established the Industrial Reconstruction 
Organization (OAE) as a state owned holding company in order to deal with 44 
large but financially problematic private companies. The initial aim of OAE 
was to reconstruct the problematic companies and make them financially 
viable. However, as the years passed the number of companies held by OAE 
more than doubled without being restructured and their debts multiplied. Thus, 
while Community member states were at least attempting to decrease inflation 
and public debts, liberalize their markets and increase their growth rates, the 
Greek government was steadily producing budget deficits, increasing public 
debt and achieving very low growth rates.  
As a result of the government’s economic policy, a chaotic in size and 
efficiency public economic sphere had been formed by 1989. It is characteristic 
that before the 1989 elections PM Papandreou publicly invited the Economics 
minister Dimitrios Tsovolas to distribute all of the available economic 
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resources to the people, a comment verifying the lack of willingness to execute 
a stabilization programme. Thus it is no surprise that Greece, under Papandreou 
was regularly characterized as the ‘awkward member’ (Papadopoulos, 2004) or 
the ‘political and economic black sheep of the EU’ (International Herald 
Tribune:13-01-99). Dinan (1994:83) argues that ‘if the EC could have foreseen 
the problems that Greek membership would pose in the 1980s and early 1990s 
during the rule of Andreas Papandreou’s anti-EC governments, the accession 
negotiations might not have concluded so swiftly, if at all’. 
In the meantime, the constant mismanagement of the Greek economy was an 
issue which the Community could not continue to ignore. As Featherstone 
(2003:933) points out ‘in March 1990, the then Commission President, Jacques 
Delors, wrote to Xenophon Zolotas, the technocratic head of the all-party 
government, warning  that the deteriorating economic situation in Greece was 
“a serious concern for all of us.” Indeed, the dire Greek situation threatened the 
ability of the EC to achieve its major common objectives: the single market, 
EMU, and the unification process as a whole’.  
 
3.2. The Greek disjointed corporatist system 
Historically, the lack of a corporatist system which would integrate interest 
groups in the policy-making process traditionally limited the role of the social 
dialogue to a restricted form dealing only with the issue of wages. Labour 
unions functioned within a polarized political environment and maintained a 
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party-political identity which fragmented them internally and encouraged the 
prevailing confrontational style of politics, regularly expressed through mass 
protests and strikes. The weakness of the labour movement to organize itself 
independently of political parties led them, in many cases, to act more as the 
extension of the political parties with which they were affiliated rather than as a 
unified collective body. As Spourdalakis (1998: 210) notes, with reference to 
Greece under the PASOK governments in the 1980s, ‘clientelistic relations lost 
their personalized character, but resurfaced through the party structure and 
activity. An important aspect of politicisation has been associated with the 
implications of party politics for interest representation: it has been suggested 
that parties have colonised interest groups’.  
In contrast, business interests were always predominantly organized along 
sectional lines and were more independent from the state. Although, many of 
the big businesses in Greece did not participate in the formal employer 
confederations, once an agreement was reached between the unions and the 
employers, all of them were obliged by law to accept the agreements and put 
them into practice. Lavdas notes (2005:311) that Greece falls under the 
category of ‘disjointed corporatism and argues that ‘the limited nature of the 
social dialogue in Greece implies the reproduction of a pattern of power 
relations which relied on a specific system of relations between political 
institutions and interest groups: a system marked by weak state capacities and 
asymmetrical penetration of state structures by various interests. The politics of 
stalled social dialogue reflect the combined difficulties in building less porous 
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political institutions and extending the Europeanising strategy to further areas. 
The Greek system of interest intermediation, with its combination of 
asymmetrically statist historical legacies, comprehensive but internally 
fragmented interest structures, resistance to extending negotiations in the 
direction of social pacts, and party-political influences, has been a case of 
‘disjointed corporatism’.  
Due to the lack of a corporatist system that guarantees broad interest 
representation, the polarized and majoritarian character of the political system 
governments have instigated privatization measures largely in a unilateral 
fashion. Thus, there is no political consensus and a lack of adequate 
consultation with the affected interest groups and consequently governments 
promoting privatization have to cope with the opposition coming from the 
political parties and the excluded interest groups. As a result governments have 
attempted to justify their choice to enact a privatization programme in the name 
of ‘Europe’. 
 
3.3. OTE as a case study  
The Greek national telecoms company OTE, was created in 1949 in order to 
bring several related public and private enterprises under one telecoms 
umbrella. Over the years the role and significance of OTE within the Greek 
society swiftly grew due to the rapid technological advancements and 
opportunities that telecoms offer. As a result by the 1980s, OTE had evolved 
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into the characteristic state champion operating within a national monopoly and 
functioning under a strict public law regime.  
The first calls to privatize OTE entered the national political agenda in 1987 as 
a result of an external stimulus, in particular the process leading to the single 
market and the introduction of pan-European competition. At that stage there 
were three major arguments in favour of the partial disembarkment of the state 
from the telecoms sector. Firstly, there were economic arguments because of 
the rising dissatisfaction with the performance of public enterprises and the 
parallel anticipation that competition would improve efficiency. Secondly, the 
rapid technological advancement seriously weakened the claim supporting the 
existence of public monopolies, which in any case would be abolished in the 
telecoms sector within the following decade due to Community legislation. 
Thirdly, there were political reasons because in certain countries, especially the 
UK, there was an evident shift in the conception of the role of the state due to 
the spread of neo-liberal thinking.  
The analysis of the privatization discourse of OTE constitutes a critical case 
study for a number of reasons. Primarily, it was the first major state owned 
entity that was put under the process of privatization by the Mitsotakis 
government in 1990 and remained on the privatization agenda of every Greek 
government –with no exception- ever since. Secondly, it was a long standing 
profit-making company as it controlled the most rapidly developing sector of 
the economy and employed a very significant number of employees. Therefore, 
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the decision to enact a privatization programme for OTE not only sparked 
reactions among trade unions and society but actually raised national 
sensitivities of ownership, highlighted conflicting economic paradigms and was 
by result a focal point of EU-driven reforms. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. The Mitsotakis government 1990-1993 
After the second consecutive electoral defeat by PASOK in 1985, the leader of 
ND Constantine Mitsotakis underlined that his party would win the next 
elections only if it convinced the public that it had been transformed into a 
modern European political party with a manifest neo-liberal economic agenda. 
As a result in June 1987 ND presented its new economic programme which 
was not only deliberately harmonized with the Community objectives, but was 
actually built around them.  
The party established as its number one priority the country’s effective 
preparation for the single market. ND stressed that it was whole-heartedly in 
favour of the single market and considered adjustment to the Community 
requirements and legislation as the only way forward in order to modernize the 
public sector and improve the national economy. This was spelled out clearly in 
the party programme (ND 1987:14) which outlined that ‘the Single European 
Act has opened the way for the completion of the European internal market. In 
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a few years’ time it will be impossible to maintain institutions that are 
anachronistic and non-productive…The vision of 1992, which Greece has also 
espoused, is a truth and therefore ND has incorporated in a harmonious and 
consistent manner all the necessary measures, institutional and others, so that 
the country may live up to the great challenge. Under these historical 
conditions, the Greek economy must regain satisfactory growth rates. This can 
only be achieved with the spread of the means of production and with the 
encouragement of private investments in all sectors of the economy and more 
specifically in industry, manufacture and services’. 
More importantly, ND was the first Greek political party to incorporate 
privatization in its manifesto, considering it as the most appropriate method to 
improve SOEs’ governance. The party’s economic programme justified the 
adoption of privatization on ideological reasons which were directly associated 
with Community developments. As a matter of fact it explicitly linked 
privatization with the single market by stating (ND 1987:18) that ‘the recent 
international developments and more specifically the European challenge that 
is embodied in the Single European Act makes it our duty, not only to put 
emphasis on the institutions of a free market economy, but to adopt with 
courage and the strong sense of duty to the future of our country the policy of 
privatization.’ In other words, ND not only argued that privatization was the 
most suitable means to modernize SOEs but formally legitimized it in its 
economic programme in the name of European integration.  
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The neo-liberal, European inspired strategy incorporated by the party helped to 
serve a triple goal. Firstly, it presented the Greek public with an alternative 
ideological foundation to help modernize the unproductive public sector in 
contrast to the socialist model advocated by PASOK. Secondly it provided ND 
with the necessary macroeconomic policies, tools and the required external 
discipline for the adoption of internal austerity reforms. And finally, as ND 
directly linked neo-liberalism with the single market, it was regarded as being a 
part of a pan-European initiative based on common principles and objectives 
and not solely on a domestic policy decision which sought to accomplish short-
term political benefits.  
The first wave of the Greek privatization programme took place during the ND 
government of Constantine Mitsotakis from 1990-1993. In its three year reign 
the Mitsotakis government placed privatization at the centre of the political 
agenda. The PM systematically linked in the communicative discourse the 
application of privatization to the Community effects through a series of 
manifestos, press releases, speeches and interviews. Characteristically, 
Mitsotakis declared (Mitsotakis:22-05-92) that ‘for us the EU is our central 
national aim and our main pursuit. This is why we will accelerate the 
privatization process, which I have to confess is a difficult matter, but recently 
our results are very positive’. 
In the case of OTE, the government used the EU based constraints, during the 
communicative discourse, as a tool to facilitate and accelerate its privatization 
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programme. The privatization plan put forward included the privatization of 
49% of the national telecoms of which 35% and the management would be sold 
to a strategic ally, 10% would be floated in the domestic Stock Market and 4% 
would be distributed to the employees of the company. The government firmly 
believed that by associating the OTE privatization with the EU strategic goals it 
would earn social justification in the eyes of the electorate, enabling it to apply 
its policies, despite the disagreement of the opposition parties and the labour 
unions. It declared that it decided to privatize OTE because (Eleftherotypia:23-
05-93) ‘by 1998 the Community is abolishing the monopoly in the telecoms 
sector. This means that all the other telecom companies can come and establish 
themselves in Greece and offer their services to the Greek consumers in 
competition with the public OTE. Do you honestly believe that under the 
current circumstances OTE could cope with such competition?…The danger is 
great to leave OTE on its own to compete with the European giants, that is why 
the government decided to give 35% of the shares of OTE to an able strategic 
ally in order to safeguard the company and help it modernize and adjust to 
present and future needs…the UK, Spain and Italy have all privatized their 
telecommunications [at least partially]…Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Denmark and Belgium have all announced that they will sell their telecoms by 
1995. In addition the German and French governments are in the process of 
passing legislation in parliament that will allow them to privatize. The entire 
world is changing, only we are remaining stubborn. 
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Figure 1: ND's OTE PRIVATIZATION PLAN 
 
At the same time though, the restoration of the public finances had evolved as 
the top government priority and the privatization of OTE was the most practical 
way to reduce budget deficits drastically. At that period it was publicly 
acknowledged by both the PM and the minister of the National Economy 
Manos that the privatization of OTE had serious fiscal implications for the 
government, which was committed to the Commission to reduce budget 
deficits. Mitsotakis noted (Eleftherotypia:15-04-93) that ‘if OTE is not 
privatized we will have problems with our budget’.  
In its public discourse the Mitsotakis government systematically linked its 
privatization programme with the accomplishment of its EU strategic goals, 
thus confirming the assumption. It stressed that privatization was a necessary 
consequence of the EU integration process and regularly associated it with the 
need to adjust to the single market and to participate in EMU. The government 
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used the EU based constraints, during the communicative discourse, as a tool to 
facilitate and accelerate its privatization programme. It firmly believed that by 
associating privatization with the EU strategic goals it would earn social 
justification in the eyes of the electorate, enabling it to apply its policies, 
despite the disagreement of the opposition parties and the labour unions. 
Although there was a systematic effort to link the privatization programme with 
the realization of the strategic EU goals, it was ultimately not completed. The 
EU may have been used as an external stimulus to promote the measure in the 
national arena, but at the same time the OTE privatization plan put forth by the 
ND government did not allow room for political and social compromise and the 
government had a very fragile parliamentary majority of only two MPs. The 
domestic actors were neither consulted nor convinced about the necessity of the 
measure. They blocked it effectively and managed to divide the governing 
party and lead it to its political collapse. 
 
4.2. Papandreou governments 1993-1996 
Before the 1993 elections Andreas Papandreou expressed his party’s intention 
to cooperate with the Community in economic policy and erase his anti-EU 
profile which he had attained as PM in the 1980s and had reinforced when he 
was in the opposition. One month before PASOK’s electoral triumph, on the 
third of September 1993, exactly 19 years after the publication of its founding 
manifesto, Papandreou presented a revised version. The party’s propensity to 
be an EU skeptic was limited in relation to the past and thus the revised 
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manifesto did not include any polemic statements against EU and NATO 
membership. In contrast, it acknowledged the importance of supranational 
institutions for a well-functioning economy and an enhanced national security. 
Papandreou actually stated that his party had embraced Europeanization by 
proclaiming (Papandreou:27-09-93) that ‘the future of our country in Europe, 
as a country that fully participates in the European evolution, will depend on 
the policy followed by the next government that will be formed after the 
elections’.  
Furthermore, the party’s economic programme was significantly altered and the 
position regarding privatization had adjusted to the new ‘Europeanization’ 
spirit. However, the party’s position regarding OTE’s privatization remained 
largely unchanged. Papandreou emphasized that OTE, should remain under 
state ownership. Characteristically, he said (Papandreou:28-09-93) that ‘if you 
give away the management and 35% of the company the country will be 
devastated. This is unacceptable. We reject it whatever the cost may be. I wish 
to make this clear…The handing over of OTE to a foreign strategic investor 
would be catastrophic for the country…If you do not control 
telecommunications in your country, then God help you.’  He claimed that his 
government would guarantee (Papandreou:28-09-93) that ‘the status quo of 
strategic state owned entities including OTE should involve a public majority 
accompanied by public and social control.  
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The party’s ideological shift whether characterized as a political adjustment or 
an electoral maneuver served a twofold objective. Firstly, PASOK had no 
reason to keep its anti-EU stance, because the EU had been identified in the 
national conscience with security and economic development, especially 
through the Delors packages. Secondly, it gave PASOK the opportunity to 
criticize the neo-liberal model proposed by ND and at the same time it offered 
an alternative set of policies that would keep both the voters and the EU 
content. In short, the integration of PASOK’s traditional socialist language and 
ideology with European policy aims indicated its development into a modern 
European socialist party. 
After taking office, Papandreou declared that the convergence programme and 
the road towards the EMU were the driving forces of the government’s 
economic policy-planning and carefully linked it to privatization. This was 
signified by the PM who commented (Papandreou:23-12-93) that ‘the Greek 
public, my government and I are constantly dedicated to the objective of 
European unification…privatization and market liberalization are policies that 
do not necessarily collide with the interests of the weaker members of society 
and the preservation of the social state’.  
A few months after the government’s inauguration, the Commission strongly 
suggested that if Greece wanted to join EMU, it had to stabilize its economy 
and maintain fiscal consolidation. As a result it recommended the adoption of 
specific measures in order to improve macroeconomic figures. It issued a report 
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stating (Kathimerini:23-03-94) that ‘it is unfeasible to successfully restructure 
the public finances by improving the tax collection mechanisms only. 
Additional measures are required which will help reform the national 
economy…Among the proposed measures are the improvement of the quality 
of services provided by the public sector through competition and 
privatization’. Papandreou was called to prove that his government was ready 
to respond to the Commission’s requirements and to restore the public finances. 
He firmly argued that such an adjustment was inescapable and outlined 
(Papandreou:27-05-94) that ‘the objective conditions made it an absolute 
necessity to adopt such measures. Absolute necessity. Even if that, as you claim 
and arguably others as well, is contrary to what we had promised before the 
elections’.  
The government was determined to adjust to the challenges of Europeanization 
even if some party members were not able to absorb such a rapid policy change 
over a relatively short period of time. The association between the 
accomplishment of the EU oriented strategic national goals and privatization, 
provided the government with the much needed social impetus to justify its 
policy shift and choices. This is verified by the non-negative response of most 
social actors to the privatization plans presented by the government. The 
example of the unions is characteristic as they admitted that they were 
unprepared for such a development but realized that privatization was an 
inevitable development and were ready to accept it as long as certain 
circumstances were met. 
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Hence in December 1993 the Finance Minister Gennimatas announced 
(Kathimerini:01-12-93) that ‘the flotation of 20% of OTE’s shares will be 
completed within a month’. The privatization announcements were formally 
made only after the Commission’s recommendations regarding the 1994 budget 
and without any public consultation with the interest groups. Apparently the 
government believed that within a month it could surpass the legal, political, 
economic, social and ‘moral’ difficulties of such a complicated venture. 
However, the main difference with the plan put forward by the previous 
government had to do with the method, which included exclusively a flotation. 
In any case though, the inherent difficulty in implementing it so rapidly made 
the government goal largely unattainable.  
Despite the temporary rescheduling of the flotation, the privatization of OTE 
had reached the top of the government’s agenda for 1994 since it was the main 
vehicle for trimming down the budget deficit. It laid much emphasis on the 
convergence programme as it was considered the driving force of the Greek 
economy. This was signified by the PM who commented (Papandreou:23-12-
93) that ‘indeed, it is a fact that the Greek economy, as the entirety of the 
European economy, is facing significant stabilization and adjustment problems. 
Our goal is to apply a series of measures in order to deal with it and help the 
economy recover…Our ultimate goal is to achieve the convergence criteria that 
will permit us to be a full member of the process that leads to the economic and 
monetary union’. Nevertheless, although the government and the Commission 
were working together to come up with a new convergence programme, the 
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latter continued to express its discomfort with the status of the Greek economy. 
One month before the formal submission of the convergence programme the 
Commission’s VP, Christofersen, repeated (Kathimerini:26-05-94) ‘the need to 
construct a credible economic programme…I am not satisfied with the progress 
of the Greek economy because we have no room to be satisfied, not even the 
government is satisfied with the excessive deficits, which are the largest within 
the Community’.  
In September 1994, one month before bringing the bill dealing with OTE’s 
partial privatization to Parliament, the Commission approved the government’s 
new convergence programme which included the flotation of OTE. The 
decision to enact a privatization strategy was welcomed by the Commission as 
a step forward and Christofersen commented (Kathimerini:02-10-94) that ‘the 
objectives the Greek government has set are realistic and can be obtained by 
1998 in order to ensure that Greece fully participates in the third stage of the 
EMU starting in 1999’. The Minister of Economics, Alekos Papadopoulos, 
confirmed this by outlining (personal interview) that ‘the decision to privatize 
OTE was directly linked to the convergence programme we had to present to 
the Commission. Our country at the time had a credibility problem 
internationally and the restoration of this credibility was the major issue of the 
government’.  
In the meantime Giannos Papantoniou, a pro EU-economist, took over in the 
Ministry of National Economy on the 15th of April 1994 and announced the 
  30 
acceleration of the OTE privatization3. Papantoniou announced that the 
percentage of shares that would be floated would be increased to 25% and since 
the Athens stock exchange would not be able to absorb such a large issue it 
decided to place 18% of OTE’s equity with international institutions abroad 
and only 7% for a domestic tranche. However, in an attempt to distinguish 
PASOK’s plan from that of the previous government, he outlined two basic 
differences. Firstly, PASOK guaranteed that the majority of the shares and the 
management of the company remained with the state. Secondly, he stressed that 
the privatization method chosen through a public flotation via the stock 
exchange was undeniably a more transparent process, than the direct trade sale 
of 35% of the company to a foreign strategic ally.  
At that stage the government argued that there were two main reasons the 
privatization should take place. Firstly it believed that it was very unlikely for a 
public sector company to adjust to the increased EU competition. Secondly, the 
flotation was a realistic way to draw additional economic resources and ease 
down fiscal difficulties. In fact it was decided that 2/3 of the privatization 
revenues would be used to fill in budget deficits whereas only 1/3 would be 
allocated to OTE, thus confirming that the government’s main motivation was 
the reduction of budget deficits, which was an EU requirement. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that Andreas Papandreou’s governments 
announced the OTE privatization on various different occasions it was never 
actually implemented. It is interesting to consider that the OTE privatization 
                                                 
3
 Gennimatas passed away 
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programmes did not fail in their application because they were incapable of 
garnering sufficient public support but did not go according to schedule due to 
government mishandlings and misfortune. Firstly, Gennimatas declared that the 
government would float 20% of OTE only one month after the Commission 
recommendations had been announced. The plan collapsed because there was a 
legal vacuum in relation to Law 2167/1993 which enabled the privatization of 
49% of OTE, which PASOK had promised to repeal. Moreover, there was no 
financial evaluation of the company. In the second case, a few months later 
Gennimatas provided for a wider time frame but his passing away found the 
government not having succeeded in dealing with either the legal vacuum or 
the company’s evaluation. In the third case, in the beginning of 1995, his 
successor, Papantoniou eventually acknowledged that the government handled 
the situation hastily as it was too early for such a project as the financial 
markets were not ready to pay the price the government had set as its minimum 
goal. Finally, in the fourth case in late 1995 the privatization was rescheduled 
after the PM was admitted to hospital. In short, the failure of the Papandreou 
government to perform the privatization of OTE was due to the ill planning of 
the process and the misfortune and not to the unpopular or ineffective reasons 
brought forth by the government.  
Similarly to the previous government, PASOK did not hesitate to justify in its 
communicative discourse its privatization programme in the name of European 
integration. This was done in a rather different manner than that of its 
predecessor. In this case it was the EU putting pressure on the Greek 
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government to privatize, whereas in the Mitsotakis government there were no 
formal EU recommendations. However, the association of privatization with 
the EU constraints was deliberately employed by the government in order to 
gather the sufficient legitimation to perform the policy, but for the reasons 
mentioned it was forced to pull back. 
 
4.3. The Simitis governments 1996-2004 
From the beginning of his term PM Simitis led the Europeanization campaign 
in a rigorous communicative discourse informing the public about possible 
consequences in case Greece did not fulfil the EMU criteria on time. Simitis 
regularly cited the prospective EMU participation as the main reason justifying 
the implementation of the restructuring of the public sector and the acceleration 
of the privatization programme. He was very effective in delivering his 
message to the general public and in explaining that failure of EMU 
participation would be damaging to the well-being of the national economy. 
The PM (Simitis:2005:169) noted that ‘PASOK’s new government simplified 
and expressed the dilemma that the country was facing at the time: do we wish 
to be part of the powerful global economic centres and have the capability to 
influence a wide area of policies and have a solid currency thus arming the 
national economy against international crises? Or do we believe that despite 
our shortcomings we will be capable, on our own, to control the international 
developments to our advantage? EMU is the means to put an end to the times 
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when Greece was a peripheral member of the Union. We should not allow our 
country to miss on any future opportunities’.  
The PM directly associated privatization with the prospective EMU 
membership and did not stop repeating that the well-being of the national 
economy was dependent on the latter. This was verified by the fact that shortly 
after becoming PM, OTE’s flotation was identified by the government as the 
primary short-term objective. The Finance Minister, Papantoniou, stated in an 
interview to Kathimerini (24-03-96) ‘as soon as the new government started 
functioning we immediately made certain decisions. The flotation of OTE, 
which is doing well, is one of the most important’.  
The key was the common understanding that both the general public and the 
government would benefit from the flotations. On the one hand, the former 
would invest in shares and gain financially, while on the other the latter needed 
to increase its revenues and draw the much needed additional resources. 
Eventually, this concurrence broadened across society and the idea of popular 
capitalism was spread to the people, which made the application of the OTE 
flotations acceptable. This is illustrated by the fact that the general demand 
during the pre-registration period in all five OTE flotations largely exceeded 
the number of shares issued. As a result, the Simitis government applied a 
series of flotations, which proved to be increasingly popular among Greek 
citizens, who endorsed the notion of popular capitalism. However, this 
agreement was not converted into a political consensus as all of the opposition 
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parties stood against the government in its privatization policy for party-politics 
reasons.  
Figure 2: OTE'S Privatizations (Flotations) During the Simitis 
Governments 1996-2004 
 
The government publicly supported EMU membership successfully in its 
communicative discourse and in turn performed pro-market reforms such as 
privatization. Simitis argued that they were the keys to EMU participation, 
which was acknowledged as the great national objective. Characteristically, the 
PM stated (Kathimerini:20-11-96) that ‘by all means we must succeed to be 
part of the core EU member states in the EMU. Only then will we be able to 
have an influential role in the decisions that will be affecting us. Therefore 
EMU membership is not only an economic issue, but mostly a political one. In 
fact the economic policy that we have decided to apply is part of an entire 
development plan which aims to restructure all of the public sector.’  
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In March 1998 the government performed a 13.8% devaluation of the drachma 
in order to make the national economy more competitive without generating 
large inflationary pressures. PM Simitis repeated constantly that such an 
approach was necessary because it was the only way to meet the EMU criteria. 
It is indicative that immediately after the PM returned from Brussels, following 
the devaluation, the speeding up of the privatization programme was formally 
announced. This was an attempt to boost the national economy on the way to 
EMU membership, as 12 additional SOEs entered the privatization agenda. On 
the same day the government held a number of meetings where it was agreed to 
float an additional 15% of OTE’s shares within 1998. Simitis eloquently 
stressed (07-05-98) that ‘our decision is the result of a realistic evaluation of 
what is taking place around us. The world is becoming more competitive and 
we must respond successfully and take advantage of these new conditions…we 
must understand that we are no longer a small country somewhere in the world, 
in the corner of Europe that can do whatever we think is better for us without 
taking into consideration what is happening around us. Whether we like it or 
not, we are part of a wider framework and we must play by the rules that apply 
to each one of the participants’. 
The government expressively acknowledged the relationship between the 
privatization of SOEs and the effort to get on track for the Euro. The pivotal 
role of privatization in the attempt to meet the EMU criteria was repeatedly 
confirmed by the Finance Minister Papantoniou who stated from New York 
city on the day of OTE’s third flotation (Kathimerini:10-10-98) that ‘the Greek 
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government is applying a very ambitious macroeconomic programme and 
readjusting it within the EU framework in order to meet the EMU entrance 
criteria by 1999…the privatization of 12 companies and 4 banks between 1998-
99 is a critical feature for the achievement of our economic objectives. 
Papantoniou repeated that the revenues from the privatizations for 1999 would 
be a record 3 trillion drachmas and stated (Kathimerini:05-05-99) that 
‘privatizations are the steam-engine of our economic goals, EMU membership, 
since they will help reduce interest rates and thus decrease inflation’. 
During the eight year tenure of the Simitis governments, more than 66% of 
OTE was privatized through five public flotations and employee share 
ownership plans and the issuance of a four-year convertible bond. The Simitis 
government considered privatization to be a useful tool that would help 
improve specific economic figures, further develop the company and stabilize 
the national economy. Privatization was relatively the most practical method to 
increase public revenues and in turn decrease the debt and close budget deficits, 
which were both among the EMU criteria.  In a report for ‘The Privatization 
International Yearbook’, Kyriazi (1998:145) noted that ‘it is ironic that the 
largest sale to the public of a state owned utility should be achieved by a 
socialist government which had previously (admittedly under a different guise) 
vetoed any attempts by the conservative ND party to undertake the sale’. 
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4.4. The Karamanlis governments 2004-2009 
Even before taking office in 2004 ND had expressed its intention in the party 
programme to attract a strategic ally for OTE because it firmly believed that it 
would help OTE further develop. In fact, when the government completed the 
strategic alliance with Deutsche Telekoms (DT) in 2008 the PM Costas 
Karamanlis commented (ND:16.05.2008) that ‘the agreement for the strategic 
alliance with one of the largest and most reliable telecoms companies in Europe 
was a pre-electoral commitment. Our manifesto specifically stated that “part of 
the states’ stake of OTE will be transferred on proper time through a strategic 
alliance, in order to permit the company to function within the liberalized 
market”. 
However, such a prospective did not enter the actual government agenda and 
become one of its main priorities until 2008. Paradoxically, though the deal 
signed with DT was not the direct result of a privatization, but an acquisition of 
shares held by a third party, Marfin Investment Groups (MIG). In any case, 
during its tenure, the Karamanlis government completed three different OTE 
flotations and one ESOP. Prior to that (in 2004) the state increased its 
shareholding of OTE to 48% as the four-year convertible bond that had been 
issued by the previous government four years ago expired and the investors did 
not acquire the OTE shares. 
The first privatization involved an ESOP as in 2004 the company initiated a 
programme of voluntary redundancies which would be financed through the 
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transfer of 4% of the company’s shares to the employee fund of TAP-OTE. 
Following that, in September 2005 and June 2007 the government floated two 
tranches of OTE’s shares of 10% and 10.7% respectively. These flotations did 
not attract much negative attention or criticism and did not need significant 
public justification as they were considered to enhance the well-established, by 
that time, concept of popular capitalism which was rather acceptable within 
society. However, it is important to note that the majority of the receipts were 
used for macroeconomic reasons in order to meet EU requirements. 
After the second floatation in 2007, an investment holding company, MIG 
started acquiring OTE shares methodically. Within six months MIG had 
purchased almost a 20% stake in the company through the market, therefore 
forcing the Greek government to adopt preemptive measures. First of all, in 
order to safeguard the state’s majority in OTE’s shareholdings the government 
passed a law in December 2007 which did not allow anybody else apart from 
the Greek state to hold more than 20% of a SOE unless there was a written 
acceptance by the Greek government. Secondly, as long as MIG remained the 
second largest shareholder in the company, the state was not able to proceed 
with any further privatization because of the threat of a hostile takeover. Hence, 
any plans to attract a strategic ally were initially suspended. In May 2008 the 
Greek government, MIG and DT reached an agreement which satisfied all three 
sides. The agreement signed with DT anticipated that the German telecoms 
company would purchase 20% of OTE’s shares from MIG, 3% from the Greek 
state and it would have to acquire an additional 2% from the stock market. 
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Despite the fact that there was a significant change in OTE’s shareholding the 
privatization involved only the 3% that the state would sell to DT. However, 
typical of Greek polarized politics, all of the opposition parties heavily 
criticized the government for its handlings. In any case, it was evident that the 
government had an ideological position regarding the entrance of a strategic 
ally in OTE and was ready to support it both in Parliament but more 
importantly in its communicative discourse. 
When the government, MIG and DT signed the deal which established the 
latter’s entrance in OTE’s shareholding the reference to Europe was not absent 
therefore sending the message to the Greek citizens that the strategic alliance 
would help OTE become more competitive in the European market. PM 
Karamanlis (ND:16.05.2008) said that ‘with regards to what is taking place in 
Europe, it is obvious that the opposition is either unaware of what is happening 
in Europe or it is pretending not to know. Therefore, I make it clear that most 
European countries have proceeded with the entire privatization of their 
telecoms providers such as in Spain, UK, Ireland, Netherlands and Portugal. 
Furthermore, two of our European partners (Sweden and Finland) have a 
common telecoms company.’ Similarly, the Minister for Transport and 
Communication Hatzidakis stated that (Hatzidakis:14.05.2008) ‘the 
government has completed today one of its central electoral promises. It has 
completed an important reform that passes a very important signal to Europe 
and the world about the prospects of the Greek telecommunications and the 
Greek economy. Today OTE enters the premier-league of European telecoms 
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as it turns OTE from a regional player to one with a more prominent role...Our 
government has followed the path of Europe and logic’.  






Finally, the last privatization was performed in June 2009, and under immense 
pressure the government was facing to maintain fiscal stability. As a result it 
sold an additional 5% to DT therefore reducing its overall percentage to 20%. 
The Finance Minister Papathanasiou, did not deny that the financial incentives 
in order to improve the macroeconomics were central in the decision to dispose 
of 5% of OTE and issued a written statement arguing that 
(Kathimerini:19.06.2009) ‘its about time we get serious in this country. Which 
Greek citizen would seriously oppose our right to activate this option, which 
will benefit the country with 674 million Euros without reducing the rights of 
the Greek government in OTE? Obviously this may be supported only by the 
opposition which is completely irresponsible and is dominated by an ultra-
populist approach’. In this case the Greek government did not justify the 
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application of privatization according to the company needs but clearly spelled 
out that it did so because it would offer the so much needed cash.  
Although the Karamanlis governments still referred to Europe as a reason 
legitimating the privatizations, the policy was not that divisive as it was in the 
previous years, since the state had already sold more than 66% of the company, 
through many different privatization schemes. Evidently, the unions and the 
general public had to a certain extent accepted the policy and there was no such 
need to appeal to Europe. As a result, the government did not need to use 
‘Europe’ that extensively -in comparison with its predecessors- during the 
domestic discourse in order to justify the policy. 
5. Conclusion 
Having examined the discourse of four consecutive Greek governments 
(Mitsotakis 1990-1993, Papandreou 1993-1996, Simitis 1996-2004 and 
Karamanlis 2004-2009), this study demonstrated that in Greece, the need to 
meet the EU set goals and the appeal to Europe was constantly utilized by 
successive governments in the domestic discourse as the main legitimating 
reason for the telecoms privatization programmes. All four governments, in one 
way or another, systematically linked their privatization plans to the 
achievement of the EU set objectives -mostly the fulfillment of the EMU 
criteria and the participation in the single market- believing that these would 
amplify their social justification. As Tsoukalis (2000: 42) comments ‘EU 
policies and rules can sometimes serve as convenient scapegoat for unpopular 
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policies at home. Greek governments have frequently made use of the 
European scapegoat, whenever domestic support was short in supply. They 
have tried to capitalise on the generally high levels of public support for the EU 
at home’.  
In addition, it is evident that the public discussion regarding privatization was 
not placed under a structured institutional frame, but was conducted mostly in 
an arbitrary and random fashion. It continuously revealed the confrontational 
style of the policy making process as the governments were not willing to make 
an effort to build an environment that would promote political and social 
consensus. They did not incorporate social groups into the policy-making 
process and they announced a series of privatizations without commencing an 
institutionalized collective dialogue. Hence, during an extensive and intensive 
communicative discourse they appealed on a regular basis directly to the 
general public and did not make an effort to coordinate their actions with the 
interest groups. Despite the ideological differences the governments had and 
their different approach to privatization, their common point was the 
justification of privatization in their communicative discourse in the name of 
‘Europe’.  
Moreover, it is worth noting that more recently, when commenting on the 
effects of the global financial recession and the EU-IMF bailout mechanism for 
Greece, Professor Ferguson of Harvard University stated (Newsweek:17.05.10) 
that ‘in desperation, the Greeks turned to their fellow Europeans for assistance.’ 
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In this case, policy-makers in Greece did not only appeal to Europe during the 
domestic discourse to justify their proposed reforms within the country. They 
actually showed that when things get rough, they resort and anticipate that 
Europe will  be there –either practically or theoretically- to redeem them. 
However, this is not necessarily a current development since one of the main 
reasons that the Greek governments of Konstantinos Karamanlis projected in 
the 1970s stating why the country should apply for EU membership had to do 
with the safeguarding of the democratic consolidation in the country, protecting 
it both from internal and external threats. Therefore the assumption that Europe 
will save Greece in difficult situations is not a recent phenomenon. 
In conclusion, the institutional setting shapes discourse in some general ways, 
but does not prescribe it. In Greece, when the government’s proposed reforms 
are likely to touch what the public sector or other well organized interest 
groups consider to be their ‘vested rights’, due to the polarized climate and the 
lack of a corporatist system, the latter unite and raise their voice against the 
reforms. As a result, consecutive governments have attempted to overpass this 
hurdle unilaterally, traditionally by appealing to the general public and by using 
‘Europe’ as their ultimate argument that would increase the social justification 
and overcome domestic blockages of interests regarding their proposed 
privatizations. However, history has proven that the appeal to ‘Europe’ may be 
under circumstances a useful tool indeed, but is not sufficient on its own to 
gather the necessary social legitimation to successfully apply the policies at 
home. 
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